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THREE TYPES OF RIGHTS* 
Lawrence C. Becker** 
Philosophers argue about whether rights are claims or entitle-
ments;' about whether or not they always entail duties for others; 2 
about whether trees, animals, fetuses, infants, and the permanently 
comatose (among others) can in principle have rights; 3 and about 
whether rights are always to take priority over other moral consider-
ations-whether they are, in Ronald Dworkin's phrase, deontologi-
cal trump cards that take any trick constructed from arguments 
about value or virtue.4 
Confusion about the general nature of rights causes, in turn, great 
difficulty for anyone interested in justifying a particular right claim. 
If rights are constraints on the principle of utility, for example, it is 
hard to see how they could be given a utilitarian justification; if 
rights are constraints on the scope of rational agreements, it is hard 
to see how they could be given a contractarian justification. To the 
extent that there is some logical bar to animals having rights, it 
seems difficult to justify the ascription of rights to human infants. 
It is not surprising, given this disarray in the theory of rights, that 
so much current talk about rights begins with a set of references to 
the author's "intuitions"-and in fact rarely gets beyond an explica-
tion (however detailed) of the consequences of those intuitions. 5 If 
we are going to continue to put so much emphasis on rights, we need 
more than the explication of intuitions. We need a general theory 
* An earlier version of this Article was read to the Duke University Philosophy Department 
Colloquium in December, 1977. It has since gone through several revisions, and I am grateful 
to my colleague H. Lamar Crosby, Jr., who has written on a related topic, and to the members 
of the Conference on Modern Rights Theory, arranged by the Institute for Humane Studies, 
for renewing my interest in the topic. This Article may be read as a set of indirect comments 
on the Articles in this issue by Antony Flew and Alan Gewirth. 
** Professor of Philosophy, Hollins College. B.A., Midland College, 1961; M.A., University 
of Chicago, 1963; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1965; Recognized Student in Law and Legal 
Philosophy, University of Oxford, England, 1971. 
1 See, e.g., Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 137, 137-42 (1966). See 
also R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS (1976). 
2 On this point, and many related ones, see Lyons, Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries, 
6 AM. PHIL. Q. 173, 173-85 (1969). 
3 See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 
S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972), referred to in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn 
Generations, in PHILOSOPHY & ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43-68 (W. Blackstone ed. 1974). 
4 SeeR. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi, 188 (1977). 
5 The leading example is perhaps Robert Nozick, in ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
Becker, Lawrence C. "Three Types of Rights." Georgia Law Review 13 
(1980): 1197-220. 
o 
THREE TYPES OF RIGHTS* 
Lawrence C. Becker** 
Philosophers argue about whether rights are claims or entitle-
ments;' about whether or not they always entail duties for others;2 
about whether trees, animals, fetuses, infants, and the permanently 
comatose (among others) can in principle have rights;3 and about 
whether rights are always to take priority over other moral consider-
ations-whether they are, in Ronald Dworkin's phrase, deontologi-
cal trump cards that take any trick constructed from arguments 
about value or virtue.4 
Confusion about the general nature of rights causes, in turn, great 
difficulty for anyone interested in justifying a particular right claim. 
If rights are constraints on the principle of utility, for example, it is 
hard to see how they could be given a utilitarian justification; if 
rights are constraints on the scope of rational agreements, it is hard 
to see how they could be given a contractarian justification. To the 
extent that there is some logical bar to animals having rights, it 
seems difficult to justify the ascription of rights to human infants. 
It is not surprising, given this disarray in the theory of rights, that 
so much current talk about rights begins with a set of references to 
the author's "intuitions"-and in fact rarely gets beyond an explica-
tion (however detailed) of the consequences of those intuitions.5 If 
we are going to continue to put so much emphasis on rights, we need 
more than the explication of intuitions. We need a general theory 
* An earlier version of this Article was read to the Duke University Philosophy Department 
Colloquium in December, 1977. It has since gone through several revisions, and I am grateful 
to my colleague H. Lamar Crosby, Jr., who has written on a related topic, and to the members 
of the Conference on Modern Rights Theory, arranged by the Institute for Humane Studies, 
for renewing my interest in the topic. This Article may be read as a set of indirect comments 
on the Articles in this issue by Antony Flew and Alan Gewirth. 
** Professor of Philosophy, Hollins College. B.A., Midland College, 1961; M.A., University 
of Chicago, 1963; Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1965; Recognized Student in Law and Legal 
Philosophy, University of Oxford, England, 1971. 
I See, e.g., Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3 AM. PHIL. Q. 137, 137-42 (1966). See 
also R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS (1976). 
2 On this point, and many related ones, see Lyons, Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries, 
6 AM. PHIL. Q. 173, 173-85 (1969). 
3 See Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 
S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972), referred to in Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn 
Generations, in PHILOSOPHY & ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43-68 (W. Blackstone ed. 1974). 
• See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi, 188 (1977). 
5 The leading example is perhaps Robert Nozick, in ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). 
1198 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13:1197 
of rights-the outlines of which I shall discuss in a moment. 
This Article is a contribution to that project. Its benefits are at 
least these: it makes a modest advance in understanding the prob-
lems involved in the justification of rights; it provides a clarification 
(if not resolution) of the debate over whether rights are claims or 
entitlements; and it yields some decisive results on the question of 
who (or what) can in principle have a right. This is enough to justify 
the tedium of a piece of distinction-making. 
I. RIGHTS PER SE 
I begin with a preliminary characterization of the root idea of a 
right-a caricature, really-designed simply to elicit the elements 
necessary for a general analysis of rights. 6 
Suppose a right is characterized as follows: 
To say that A has a (legal or moral) right against B is to say 
that A has a (legal or moral) claim on an act or forbearance 
from B-meaning that, should B fail to so act or to so forbear, 
it would be (legally or morally) justifiable for A to use coercion 
to extract either the act or forbearance from B, or compensa-
tion in lieu of it. 
This characterization suggests all the elements necessary for an 
analysis of the concept of a right as that concept is currently used. 
Specifically, it suggests that a complete account of a particular right 
(for example, a right to life) involves: 
1) The specification of the right holder(s}-that is, what per-
sons, beings, or things have the "claim." 
2) The specification of the right regarder(s}-that is, what 
"other(s)"-if any-the right holder has a claim against. (Some 
reflection on the sorts of rights people are said to have indicates that 
it is not always clear that th~ existence of right-regarders is being 
asserted. Think of the putative right to health care.) 
3) The specification of the act(s} or forbearance(s}-that is, the 
thing(s) the right regarder(s) must do, or must refrain from doing; 
what they may do, or may not do; or in the case of "regarderless" 
rights, the benefits to which the right-holders have a "claim." 
4) The definition of the nature of the rights-relationship-that 
is, the sort of claim the holder has on the regarder; or the sort of 
• In this section I review briefly, and with some modifications, the analysis presented in 
my PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS ch. 2 (1977). 
() 
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claim the holder has on some benefit. 
5) The definition of the conditions under which the right may 
be said to have been violated-that is, the circumstances-if 
any-which constitute a right regarder's culpable "failure" to act or 
forbear as required. (The "violation" of a right must be distin-
guished from mere delay in doing what is required, and from non-
culpable failure to do it.) 
6) The definition of the conditions under which a violation of the 
right (though culpable) is nonetheless excusable. 
7) The specification of remedies for both excused and unexcused 
violations of the right. 
8) The specification of coercive measures for extracting the 
remedies. 
9) The specification of the agent(s) who may extract the 
remedies. 
10) The justification of the right defined by (1)-(9) above-that 
is, the assembly of reasons which warrant the conclusion that the 
right holder(s) do in fact have such a (legal or moral) claim. 
A moment's thought about these elements reveals the inadequa-
cies of the preliminary characterization of the root idea of a right. 
We cannot say as it does-at least not without begging some impor-
tant questions-that all rights are claims against others; or that 
"compensation" is to be understood in its ordinary sense (perhaps 
in some cases a mere apology will suffice); or that "coercion" is to 
be given a literal meaning (perhaps sometimes a verbal demand is 
as far as one may properly go); or that the right holder is the one 
who may apply the coercion (perhaps only a law enforcement officer 
may do so). Rights can evidently take a wide variety of forms-from 
those vague entitlements that apparently point the finger at no one 
in particular (because no one in particular can be said to be a right-
regarder with respect to the holder), to the full dress legal rights 
whose violation calls down the power of the state. 
Further, reflection on these ten elements shows how misleading 
it may be to speak of even a full dress legal right as involving a claim 
on an act or forbearance from another. Hohfeld's analysis of the 
sorts of rights-relationships recognized in law is instructive here.7 
One may have rights in the strict sense, he said (claim rights, as I 
refer to them), which entail the existence of correlative duties in 
others. But one may also have privileges (liberty rights) which sim-
7 W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919). 
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ply correlate with the qbsence of claim rights in others. And one may 
have powers (such as the right to make a will) which correlate with 
liabilities in others, or immunities (such as the right to remain 
silent) which correlate with disabilities in others. Each of these 
relationships is commonly referred to as a right, but it disguises a 
good deal to characterize all of them as "claims against someone for 
an act or forbearance." 
In short, the ten elements 'mentioned above provide a convenient 
device for understanding the complexity of the concept of a right. 
The failure to understand this complexity-or perhaps, just the 
failure to understand it systematically-causes at least some of the 
confusion in the theory of rights. 
II. GENERAL THEORY OF RIGHTS 
Just as I assume that the definition of a particular right (such as 
a right to life) requires the filling in of all ten elements mentioned 
above, so too I assume that a general theory of rights requires a 
general account of how each of the ten elements can in principle be 
filled in for specific sorts of rights. That is, it requires an account of 
who (or what) can in principle be a right-holder, or a right-regarder; 
it requires an account of the general nature of the rights-relationship 
that can obtain between holders and regarders; and so forth. 
Hohfeld, as I mentioned above, has given an admirable (if some-
what incomplete) account of the general nature of rights-
relationships. That is one part of a general theory of rights. What I 
shall do here is focus on another element necessary for a general 
theory: element (10) in the list-the nature of justification. Specifi-
cally, I will explore a trichotomy in the way rights are justified (or, 
as I shall sometimes say, in the way they are "established"). This 
trichotomy is independent of the "substance" of a justificatory 
strategy-that is, it is independent of whether one is attempting a 
utilitarian, contractarian, or some other justification. It is a simple 
distinction, but one which goes a long way toward clearing away 
confusion in the theory of rights. 
The trichotomy to which I refer is (oversimply) this: (1) Some 
rights are held only derivatively, by way of the existence of duties 
(or other Hohfeldian rights-correlatives) in others. (2) Other rights 
originate, so to speak, in the right holders-and entail duties, or no-
rights, or liabilities, or disabilities, in others. (3) Still other rights 
arise simultaneously, as it were, with their correlatives-as when 
rights and duties are created together by the making of a contract. 
I propose to call the first sort of rights derivative rights; the second 
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sort original rights; and the third sort concurrent rights. (It should 
be noted that the temporal language here is only a metaphor for 
matters of logical priority. It is not meant to be taken literally-that 
is, to refer to matters of temporal priority-or to suggest causal 
relationships.) First, then, derivative rights. 
III. DERIVATIVE RIGHTS 
Some arguments for the existence of a right proceed by first estab-
lishing the existence of a right-correlative of some sort. For example, 
one may first establish that B has a duty to A. It then (apparently) 
follows that A, as the beneficiary of that duty, must "have" some-
thing-in fact, must have a claim right, if "right" is understood as 
the Hohfeldian correlative of "duty." Arguments for the existence 
of such rights do not depend (in principle) on whether the right-
holders have conscious interests, or are able to "make" claims on 
others, or are able to make agreements with others. The arguments 
depend only on whether a duty toward that (putative) right-holder 
exists. Such rights are derivative-established entirely by deriva-
tion from the (logically) prior existence of duties in others. There are 
analogous arguments which proceed from the prior establishment of 
no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities. 
In principle, derivative rights can be either natural or conven-
tional, depending on whether they come from natural or conven-
tional rights-correlatives. I shall focus here on rights that are deriva-
ble from duties. The arguments can easily be modified, however, to 
deal with the rights derived from no-rights, liabilities, and disabili-
ties. 
A. The Nature and Scope of Derivative Rights 
Derivative rights clearly are entitlements. That is, we would 
clearly be willing to use that word to describe any such right: a duty 
toward A entitles A to certain acts or forbearances from B; a no-
right with respect to A entitles A to act in certain ways regardless 
of B's wishes; a liability with respect to A entitles A to alter B's 
rights, duties, liabilities or disabilities; and a disability with respect 
to A entitles A to freedom from a liability. 
It is difficult to construe derivative rights as claims (of any famil-
iar sort) that are distinct' from entitlements. Anyone who has a right 
may claim acts or forbearances from others, of course. Or such 
claims may be made on behalf of the right holder. It is clear, how-
ever, that the right exists whether the claim is made or not. So the 
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sense in which derivative rights are claims seems equivalent to the 
sense in which they are entitlements: namely, in the case of claim 
rights, their requirement of an act or forbearance from someone (or 
compensation in lieu of it); in the case of liberty rights, their denial 
of a contravening claim in others; and so on. 
Derivative rights may be held by anyone, or anything, to whom 
duties (or no-rights, liabilities, or disabilities) are born. The ques-
tion is whether there are conceptual limits to that sort of relation-
ship, or whether derivative rights may in principle be held by any 
object-for example, by rocks, trees, animals, human fetuses, and 
the permanently comatose. 
1. Duties toward and duties concerning. -One step commonly 
taken toward an answer to that question is to point out that one may 
have duties concerning something or someone without actually hav-
ing duties toward that thing or person.s For example, my duty to 
help Jones may actually be a duty to Jones' friend rather than 
Jones. (Consider: "Mr. Jones, because lowe your friend a favor and 
because she wants me to do this, I feel duty bound to do it-even 
though I think you're worthless and I certainly don't owe you any-
thing.) This is a duty concerning Jones, but (apparently) not a duty 
to Jones. We would not want to say, in such a case, that Jones had 
a right against me at all. It is Jones' friend whe has the right-a 
right that I help Jones. 
So to be able to say who (or what) has a derivative right in a given 
case, we need to be able to say "to" whom-as opposed to 
"concerning" whom-the duty (or other rights-correlative) is born. 
Offhand, I see no way of doing this at the level of formal analysis. 
One cannot simply say that the duty is "to" the person whose inter-
ests it satisfies, or who is an essential (as opposed to accidental) 
beneficiary of the duty. These descriptions fit both Jones and his 
friend. I suspect that in each case the question will have to be 
settled by an analysis of the substance of the considerations that 
justify the duty. (For example, in this case, the duty is defined by 
a relationship between Jones' friend and me, not between Jones and 
me.) 
How to handle particular cases, however, is not the problem here. 
What is needed is some guidance on the question of the range of 
potential right-holders. And the distinction between duties "to" and 
• See the discussion in Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 180 (1955); 
and Lyons, supra note 2. 
o 
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duties "concerning" may yet be of help. 
Surely we can say, can we not, that anyone or anything that could 
benefit from another's performance of duty could be someone (or 
something) "to" whom the duty is born? That is, surely the capacity 
to be a "beneficiary" is sufficient to guarantee one the status of a 
potential holder of derivative rights. It may not be a necessary con-
dition; that is, there may be other ways to become a potential right 
holder. And it is certainly not sufficient to establish that one is a 
right holder. If one could benefit, however, surely it is logically 
possible that one could be a derivative right holder. (The only evi-
dence one can give for this assertion is, of course, the absence upon 
semantic analysis of a contradiction between the two propositions: 
(1) A could conceivably benefit from the performance of a duty; and 
(2) the duty could (considering only (1) above) conceivably be "to" 
A. I take it that there is no contradiction between the two.) 
2. Possible beneficiaries of duties. -As it turns out, this is 
enough to guarantee the status of potential (derivative) right 
holder to virtually everything. Certainly it is true that any animate 
being-whether purposive or not, whether it has conscious interests 
or not, whether it is sentient or not-could be benefitted by the 
performance of a duty. The case is not so clear for inanimate objects, 
but it leans in that same direction. The chain of argument which 
establishes this proposition runs as follows: 
1) People can be benefitted (or harmed) without being aware of 
it at the time-or indeed without ever being aware of it-in the 
sense that their interests can be advanced or compromised without 
their knowing it . 
. 2) This is so (at least in part) because people may not actually 
be aware of their "true" interests-e.g., those things they would 
want for themselves if they were perfectly rational and all-knowing; 
or those things they would want if they were not self-deceiving; or 
those things they would want if they were more reflective or in-
trospective. 
3) If awareness of an interest is not a necessary condition for 
having an interest, then the notion of having an interest must be 
connected to an "objective" as well as a "subjective" notion of 
people's welfare. That is, we must be able to make sense of the 
notion of an event being "in" a person's interest ("for" his or her 
welfare) without essential reference to whether or not that person 
actually does or ever could be aware of that interest. 
4) Such an "objective" notion of an individual's wel-
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fare-understood perhaps in terms of what the individual would 
want if he or she were aware of the relevant facts-must then be 
based on the observer's appreciation of what the individual would 
want under those counterfactual conditions. 
5) It is from such an "objective" stance that we can say, as 
observers, that subjects are harmed or benefitted even if they are 
not subjectively aware of it. 
6) Now: if this is true for humans-that is, if it makes sense to 
say that they can be benefitted or harmed whenever it is the case 
that, had they been aware of all the facts, and had they been reflec-
tive and rational, they would have wanted (or not wanted) the 
event-then the same must be true of any living being. Trees can 
be benefitted or harmed in the same way. We have an objective, or 
observer's, notion of their welfare-their "interests"-which is not 
dependent on the presence or absence of a subjective awareness of 
those interests by the trees themselves. We say-no more metaphor-
ically for the tree than for the adult human being-that it can be 
harmed, helped, injured, damaged, destroyed, or restored to health. 
In neither case are we making necessary reference to consciousness, 
purposiveness, sentience, or subjective awareness of any kind. The 
language of interests may be metaphorical here-both in the case 
of a person's "true" interests and in the case of a tree's inter-
ests-but the language of benefit and harm is not. The language of 
benefit and harm is what is relevant to the question of who can be 
a beneficiary of a duty. 9 
7) Thus, any entity for which one can construct such an objec-
tive notion of welfare can be the beneficiary of a duty-and hence 
the holder of a derivative right. 
8) I take it that this is decisive in the case of all animate 
beings-that is, that the construction of an objective notion of their 
welfare is possible. Thus, human fetuses, neonates, the catastrophi-
cally retarded, and the permanently comatose can all in principle 
be benefitted or harmed and can therefore hold derivative rights. A 
similar conclusion is true for trees, fish, sponges, carrots, and other 
animate beings. 
9) What I take to be decisive in the case of animate beings I take 
to be at least suggestive in the case of inanimate entities. Interfer-
ence with their equilibrium mechanisms looks very much like inter-
ference with the growth of a plant, or with the homeostatic mecha-
• My colleague, H. Lamar Crosby, Jr., has explored a similar notion in Reflections on the 
Scope of Justice (in typescript). 
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nisms of an animal. Bizarre as it sounds, if an objective notion of 
welfare-constructed by counterfactual speculation-is possible for 
humans and other living beings, why not for inanimate objects as 
well? My hesitancy here is due more to the novelty of the proposi-
tion than to any argument I can find against it. 
In general, then, the conclusion is that the class of potential deriv-
ative right-holders includes animals, fetuses, trees, the comatose, 
and probably even inanimate objects. This is not to say, of course, 
that each of these objects can hold any sort of derivative right. Some 
rights-relationships (such as powers, or liberties to act) require in 
principle a potentially "active" right holder-that is, one who can 
exercise a power or a liberty. It makes no sense to speak of the right 
of an inert gas to make a will. The situation is the same for some 
claim rights and immunities; they too may require a potentially 
active right-holder. (Think of the immunity right to remain silent; 
or the claim right to an education.) But claim rights and immunity 
rights can be purely passive relationships on the part of the right 
holders. (Think of the claim right to freedom from deliberate inter-
ference with one's welfare.) This is what makes the class of potential 
derivative right-holders so large. 
B. Justifying Duties 
Whether there are in fact any duties to inanimate objects (or 
vegetables, and rudimentary forms of animal life, for that matter) 
has of course not been settled here. From the fact that these things 
are potential right-holders, it does not follow that any of them are 
right-holders. It only follows that we cannot rule out, on purely 
formal grounds, all derivative rights that might be claimed for 
them. 
I noted earlier, however, that derivative rights could in principle 
be either natural or conventional, depending upon whether the cor-
relatives from which they were derived were natural or conven-
tional. I now make a few remarks on this distinction, because it has 
some bearing on the next sort of right to be considered: original 
rights. 
1. Natural duties.-The crux ofthe distinction between natural 
and conventional duties (or rights) is clearly in the sort of considera-
tions that justify them or "establish their existence." That is, I 
know of no reason in principle why natural duties should have either 
a special content (e.g., concerning the minimum conditions neces-
sary for survival) or a special form (e.g., applicability to all). Rather, 
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it is apparent that what is fundamental to the distinction is the 
thought that some duties (the natural ones) might "exist" indepen-
dently of anyone's knowledge of them, or assent to them. It would 
thus make sense to speak of "discovering" such duties as opposed 
to creating them. We create duties by convention; we justify 
them-establish their existence-by appeal to convention. We dis-
cover, or "find," natural duties; we justify them-establish their 
existence-by appeal to something other than convention. 
What is that "something other"? The answer is in large measure 
determined by the initial characterization of the distinction be-
tween the' natural and the conventional. For present purposes, I 
shall regard as "natural" any duty that can be justified without 
reference to an agreement or aim to create that particular duty. 
(This may be a more expansive definition than some would favor, 
but I think it is a harmless expansion.) 
Such natural duties (i.e., justifications for duties) are of at least 
three sorts. First, a duty is a natural one if its existence is entailed 
by the existence of duties per se. For example: 
1) If there are some duties whose existence cannot be disputed 
(e.g., some conventional duties); and 
2) If any such duties, regardless of their content, entail a further 
duty X; then 
3) That further duty X is a natural one. It is natural because it 
is not itself the product of a specific convention aimed at creating 
that particular duty, but rather the product of the form of all such 
activity. The existence of such a duty is contingent on the existence 
of convention, but it is not itself conventional. (H. L. A. Hart has 
offered an analogous argument for the existence of a natural right 
to liberty.)10 
Second, the existence of a natural duty may be established by 
reference to the conditions necessary for the realization of social or 
individual goals. For example: 
(1) If some goal Y is (morally) justifiable; and 
(2) If the existence of a duty X is necessaryll for the realization 
of the goal Y; and 
10 Hart, supra note 8. 
11 Similar, but weaker, arguments may be constructable from the premise that the imposi-
tion of a duty X is simply the best (most effective) means for realizing a justifiable goal, but 
I shall avoid that complication here-and in the next argument below. I assume that if a duty 
X is only one of several equally effective means, the argument as it stands would not go 
through. 
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(3) If there are no (sufficient) reasons for thinking that the 
existence of the duty X is unjustifiable; then 
(4) The existence of duty X is justifiable-in the sense that 
there are good reasons for having it (its necessity for the realiza-
tion of a morally justifiable goal), and no countervailing rea-
sons for not having it. 
A duty so established may plausibly be called a natural one because 
it does not arise from an aim to create that particular duty, but 
rather raises as a consequence of other activities and circumstances. 
The existence of such duties is contingent on the existence of just if i-
able goals for whose realization they are necessary, and upon the 
absence of countervailing reasons. The duties may thus range from 
impermanence in the extreme to permanence, depending on the 
universality and/or stability of the goals involved and other relevant 
circumstances. For example, one supposes that survival goals 
among normally formed human beings are relatively universal and 
stable, and that any natural duties derived from such goals (such 
as the prohibition of murder) would be likely to have similar charac-
teristics. On the other hand, some of the "duties of friendship" may 
be as fleeting as the whims of one's friends and/or one's freedom 
from something better to do. 
The third way in which a natural duty may be justified is by 
reference to the requirements of justifiable social institutions. 
Human parents, for example, may be said to have duties to their 
children in part because the institution of the family requires them. 
In general: 
(1) If an institution is (morally) justifiable as it is defined; and, 
(2) If-although its definition does not itself entail the exist-
ence of a duty X-that duty is necessary to the continued 
viability of the institution; and 
(3) If there are no (sufficient) reasons for thinking that the 
existence of the duty X is unjustifiable; then 
(4) The existence of duty X is justifiable in the sense that there 
are good reasons for having it (its necessity for the viability of 
a justifiable institution), and no countervailing reasons for not 
having it. 
A duty so established may also be called a natural one. It too does 
not arise from an aim to create that particular duty. Its existence 
may be contingent upon the existence of institutions established by 
convention, but it is not itself a conventional duty. 
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2. Conventional duties.-Given what has been said about natu-
ral duties, conventional ones may be defined as duties that are the 
(justifiable) products of activities aimed specifically at creating 
those duties. 
Some conventional duties emerge gradually from customary be-
havior by the growth of a consensus that what is customary should 
be obligatory. Others emerge from a consensus unrelated to existing 
customs (for example, from a consensus generated by revolutionar-
ies or reformers). Still others arise from regularized legislative or 
contractual processes. 
The justification of particular conventional duties may take 
roughly the same form as that for natural duties: 
(1) If the consensus exists (or if people have explicitly agreed) 
that B has a duty X; and 
(2) If there are no reasons sufficient for thinking that that duty 
for B is unjustifiable; then 
(3) That duty is justifiable in the sense that there is good rea-
son for B's having it (people want B to have it), and no counter-
vailing reasons for B's not having it. 
Conventional duties include, but are not limited to, contractual 
duties. 
Similar arguments can be made for other Hohfeldian categories. 
A no-right, or a liability, or a disability may in principle be regarded 
as either natural or conventional, and if its existence is established 
first, and used to argue for the existence of the corresponding lib-
erty, power, or immunity, then one has an argument for a different 
sort of (natural or conventional) derivative right. 
IV. ORIGINAL RIGHTS 
I turn now to the second sort of right in the trichotomy-the rights 
I have called original rights. The basic idea is simple: Many argu-
ments about rights are not about derivative rights at all. That is, 
they do not attempt to establish a duty or other correlative first and 
then derive a right from ~t. Rather, they attempt to establish the 
right-holder's claim or entitlement first, and then to derive the ap-
propriate correlative from that. 
The motive for finding such rights is not hard to see. There is, 
after all, something unsatisfying about saying that a child's right to 
life comes only from the prior existence of duties in others; that 
there is nothing about a child which "reaches out," as it were, and 
makes a claim on others-a claim which itself constitutes a right 
1979] THREE TYPES OF RIGHTS 1209 
from which others' duties are then derived. If there are derivative 
rights (e.g., rights entailed by duties), are there not also derivative 
duties? Are there not duties whose existence is established by infer-
ence from the existence of rights? 
The temptation to say "Of course" to such questions is strong. 
The notion of a right that rests on-is established by reference 
to-others' duties seems too weak to express the force of a person's 
right to life, for example. Surely that right must originate somehow 
"with" or "in" the person. 
The difficulty of saying just how such an original right could be 
established, however, is notorious. Some people hold that one must 
find some "morally relevant characteristics" of the putative right-
holder that yield the rigat. 12 If this is the strategy adopted it is clear 
that one must find a characteristic that is not dependent upon a 
right-making "bargain" between the parties. Original rights are not 
contractual rights. 
A. Conventional Rights 
Some original rights, however, may be conventional. That is, an 
original right might emerge from a consensus in much the way a 
conventional duty does. It might emerge from custom, as customary 
behavior gradually achieves the status of an entitlement for which 
there is no countervailing moral argument. It may emerge from a 
consensus about entitlements provoked by reformers or revolution-
aries. Or it may come through regularized legislative processes, in-
cluding the legislative acts of judges and executives. (Again, as in 
the case of customary behavior, such rights are only established 
when there is no countervailing moral argument to be found.) 
The difference, then, between a conventional derivative right' and 
a conventional original right is the priority given to the justification 
of the right rather than its correlative. Of course, this priority may 
be purely "temporal" -in which case the warrant for saying that the 
right is either derivative or original disappears. (The rights and 
duties thus establishep are best thought of as concurrent ones, 
which I discuss below.) The priority may, however, be logical as 
well. That is, it may be that the concern to establish the right-
12 See Michael Tooley's discussion in Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 37 
(1972), amended and expanded in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 52-84 (M. Cohen ed. 
1974). See also Robert Nozick's remarks on the moral basis of rights in ANARCHY, STATE AND 
UTOPIA 28-35 (1974), criticized by Samuel Scheffler in Natural Rights, Equality, and the 
Minimal State, 6 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 59 (1976). 
1214 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13:1197 
admittedly many things which (given the proper setting) count as 
exercising a power: for example, the explicit, conscious, overt claim-
ing of a right; or expressions of a preference, It seems clear, however, 
that, by definition, if an entity is incapable of purposive activity per 
se, it could not exercise a power-right, 
To the extent that claims of right (as original rights) rest upon 
power-rights, then, they require that holders have the capacity for 
purposive activity, Further, they require that some such activity, 
which can reasonably be construed as the exercise of a power, be 
performed by the right-holder. There is reason to think that many 
animals or human infants can meet these conditions: They can in 
principle have at least derivative powers, or even conventional, orig-
inal ones; and they can do things which, were they done by humans 
in the same context, would unquestionably count as the exercise of 
a power. The question of whether animals or infants have natural, 
original rights by way of claiming them is thus reduced to whether 
they have the corresponding power-rights. 
D. Status Rights 
There is still something unsatisfying in this account. It is often 
insisted that people's rights to life or liberty, for example, do not 
depend on their exercise of any power, but come simply from their 
status as human beings. (The same sort of insistence is then occa-
sionally extended to other species.) This sort of right-a natural, 
original, status right-is difficult to justify, however. 
Consider: It is easy enough (in principle) to establish derivative 
status rights, natural or conventional. All one has to do is establish 
the relevant correlative duties-duties that yield rights to all mem-
bers of that group. And it is easy enough to establish the relevant 
correlative duties. It is also easy enough to establish original status 
rights by appeal to convention: If we agree that humans have some 
right simply by virtue of their status as humans, and there are good 
reasons for so agreeing and no countervailing ones to be found, then 
surely humans have that right. 
What we are looking for here, however, is a status right that does 
not derive from prior duties in others, and that does not depend on 
convention. We have to find grounds for an argument of the form: 
(1) There are good reasons for holding that all A's, simply by 
virtue of their status as A's, have right R (from which the 
rights-correlatives of others derive). 
II 
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(2) The fact (if it is a fact) that people (no matter how many) 
refuse to agree that A's have right R is irrelevant to whether or 
not A's have that right. 
(3) There are no countervailing reasons to (1). 
(4) Therefore, A's have right R. 
In outline, this is no less concrete than the accounts given above 
for derivative rights and conventional, original ones. In those earlier 
cases, however, it was easy to see that the set of rights so defined 
was not in principle empty. One could imagine the sorts of consider-
ations that would establish such rights. 
In the case of the argument form just given, however, it is not easy 
to see how premises (1) and (2) could be established. What sorts of 
reasons could there be to support a natural, original, status right? 
A common suggestion is to explore certain characteristics possessed 
by "persons" (i.e., individuals who have a self-concept and are pur-
posive) .13 I shall therefore focus on that suggestion, to illustrate the 
justification of status rights. 
1. Personal rights. -Self-consciousness-that is, being con-
scious of oneself as distinct from other things and other per-
sons-necessarily involves a "sense" of physical and psychological 
boundaries. If my body is distinguishable from its surroundings, it 
necessarily has physical boundaries. To the extent I am conscious 
of it as distinct, I am conscious of boundaries. Further, if my con-
sciousness is normally inaccessible to others except by inference 
from my behavior (verbal or otherwise), spatial (boundary) meta-
phors for this fact are appropriate. My consciousness of myself as 
an entity necessarily· includes, then, consciousness of physical 
boundaries and consciousness of the "separateness" of my con-
sciousness itself. Further, persons invariably "manage" these 
boundaries-by making a distinction between trespass and visit, as 
it were, and acting accordingly. 
Human persons are also purposive. They have projects that they 
strive to achieve'-even if these projects are not fully self-conscious; 
even if they are self-annihilating. And they resist interference with 
these projects. 
All the behavior just mentioned-the boundary-keeping, the re-
sistance to interference with projects-can be part of the process of 
claiming rights, of course. But it is their dispositional aspect-the 
13 By far the most detailed and systematic attempt to work out such a position is Alan 
Gewirth's. See his REASON AND MORALITY (1978) and his article included in this symposium. 
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fact that human persons as we know them always stand ready to 
make such demands-that seems to provide an opening for an argu-
ment for status rights. The argument proceeds as follows: 
If boundary-keeping and resistance to interference are necessary 
consequences of becoming a person (i. e., developing a self-concept 
and becoming consciously purposive), and if such persons exist, and 
if they want to continue to exist, it it reasonable to place the burden 
of proof on anyone who proposes to trespass personal boundaries, or 
interfere with a person's purposive behavior. If such trespassing or 
interference cannot be justified, the way is open for a further argu-
ment to establish personal rights to liberty. That argument would 
have to show that there are good reasons to recognize entitlements 
in persons to freedom from trespass (of their personal boundaries) 
and freedom from interference with their purposive conduct.14 
Now the problem with concluding that status rights are original 
rather than derivative (or concurrent) is just this: While it is true 
that their justification begins with a reference to the characteristics 
of the putative right-holder and then shifts the burden of proof to 
others to show that they do not have the correlative duty (or no-
right, liability, or disability), the same logical form can be used to 
justify duties first. In short, while the justification of such rights 
depends on characteristics of the right-holder, there is apparently 
no more reason to think that those characteristics lead (logically) 
to original rights than to derivative ones. If this is so for personal 
(status) rights, it would seem to hold for any attempt to argue for a 
natural, original, status right. 
I think this is wrong, for the following reasons. Arguments that 
make primary reference to the putative duty-bearer's roles, inter-
ests, and goals (even though they also involve essential reference to 
the right-holder's status, interests, or whatever), seem clearly di-
rected-as a matter of logical form-to establishing the duty first. 
It is not just a matter of indifference which one is established first, 
for the whole point is to secure the ascription of a duty (or other 
right-correlative) even if no particular right-holder can be identified 
with certainty. Similarly in the case of original rights: the point of 
those arguments is to justify the entitlement of the holder-whether 
or not a particular class of right-regarders can be specified. Of 
course it can be a matter of (logical) indifference as to which comes 
14 I have argued for the soundness of the general form of such arguments in ON JUSTIFYING 
MORAL JUDGMENTS (1973). 
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first (and in those cases, I would classify the rights as concurrent 
ones, as I do below). But it need not be a matter of indifference. 
This opens the door, in principle, for the justification of status 
rights for virtually anything. Rights requiring the capacity for action 
(e.g., powers or liberties) are of course restricted to entities with 
those capacities. "Passive" rights (e.g., some sorts of claim rights 
and immunities), however, are not so restricted. 
E. Interests 
A final word about interests is in order. Some have urged (either 
implicitly or explicitly) that a being's capacity to have interests is 
a necessary condition of its having rights. 15 For reasons which should 
by now be clear, I think such an assertion is seriously misleading at 
best. 
V. CONCURRENT RIGHTS 
I turn now to the final part of the trichotomy-concurrent rights. 
The basic idea is simple enough: There "are times when it is odd to 
think of either a right or its correlative as being antecedent to the 
other-when it appears that A's rights and B's corresponding duties 
(or other correlatives) arise concurrently. Example: Suppose a third 
party drafts a document that, if accepted by A and B, would create 
a right in A and a duty in B. The document is presented to A and 
B and they say, simultaneously, "I accept." B now has a duty to-
ward A, and A has a right against B. But the right is neither derived 
from nor antecedent to the duty. It arises concurrently with the 
duty. 
The establishment of such rights can be achieved by a straight-
forward application of the justificatory strategies outlined in the 
preceding pages. It seems clear that, in principle, there could be 
both natural and conventional rights of this sort. 
It is, however, sometimes difficult to resist the thought that all 
rights are at bottom concurrent ones. If each right has a correla-
tive-if, in fact, the existence of a right logically entails the exist-
ence of a correlative duty, or no-right, or liability, or disabil-
ity-then it may appear that all rights and their correlatives are 
concurrent ones. The only significant difference between concurrent 
rights and derivative and original ones seems then to be one of 
emphasis. Which element in the dyad is the focus of attention? 
15 See text and references in Feinberg, supra note 3. 
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Which element gets the initial justificatory argument (leaving the 
other to be derived from it)? Couldn't the attention and justificatory 
strategy always in principle be focused concurrently on both 
elements? 
To see that this is not so, consider: In the case of original rights, 
the focus of attention (and the initial justificatory argument) are 
necessarily on the right holder because the right holder's character-
istics are primarily responsible for generating the right-relationship. 
And in the standard offer and acceptance analysis of the making of 
a contract, the right-relationship emerges in stages: A has the power 
(right) to make an offer to B; A makes the offer, creating in B a 
power to accept and thus create a contract. B's power to accept, 
when exercised, creates the duties and rights mentioned in the con-
tract. Here we may have all three sorts of rights: A's power-right to 
make an offer to B may be an original one. A's exercise ofthe power 
is what creates B's power (right) to accept. B's power-right is in that 
sense derivative from A's power-right. And B's acceptance creates 
concurrent rights and duties in A and B. The distinctions among the 
three sorts of rights are thus more than merely rhetorical or heuris-
tic. 
Of course the distinctions can be merely incidental matters of 
emphasis. In the case of conventional or natural rights where the 
justificatory arguments rest as much on the character and status of 
the duty-bearers as it does on the character and status of the right 
holders (and vice-versa), the focus on one or the other may have 
only a rhetorical or heuristic jus~ification. But that should not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that there are cases in which the dis-
tinctions are formal rather than rhetorical. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The point of this article has been to clear away some of the confu-
sion about the concept of a right. No normative conclusions have 
been established directly, but there are some logical consequences 
of relevance to normative discussions. 
A. Animals' Rights 
For one thing it is clear that there is no formal obstacle to estab-
lishing a wide variety of rights for non-human animals. They can, 
of course, in principle have (both natural and conventional) deriva-
tive rights. To the extent that an animal can have interests, or make 
(J 
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claims, or has a self-concept and is purposive, (natural) original 
rights are possible. In fact, the only serious formal limitation on the 
whole class of those non-human animals now known to us is the 
same as one of the limitations on human infants (and some incom-
petent adults): They cannot have those conventional rights in which 
the right-holder must make an explicit agreement to accept a speci-
fied rights-relationship (e.g., an agreement to the terms of a con-
tract). They cannot have such rights because they cannot make 
such agreements. 
There are, of course, severe formal limitations on the rights that 
can be held as one goes down the evolutionary ladder. Dogs may be 
able to make (some sorts of) claims. But can oysters? Chimpanzees 
may be persons, but are bees? Regardless of the priority to be as-
signed to human rights, then, there are at least some rights that 
normal adults of our species can hold which normal adults of other 
species cannot hold. And at the lowest end of the scale, it is proba-
bly fair to say that the only rights those animals (like sponges or 
clams) actually have are certain sorts of derivative rights. 
B. Trees, Rocks and Fresh Water Streams 
Non-animal elements of the environment probably can have some 
sorts of derivative and concurrent rights, too. Thus, if there is a legal 
question as to whether trees can be right-holders, and if derivative 
rights are enough to give humans legal standing, then the burden 
of proof is surely on anyone who wishes to deny that trees can have 
standing. But again the range of types of rights available is severely 
limited. I see no way that it could include natural, original rights, 
for example. 
C. Zygotes, Embryos, Fetuses and Infants 
The rights available in principle to human beings increase as 
biological development proceeds. Zygotes do not make claims or 
have a self-concept. (At least we have no reason to think so, and 
many reasons to think not.) They can, however, have derivative or 
concurrent rights of the same sorts available to trees and shellfish. 
As development proceeds, the fetus appears to be able to make 
some of the same sorts of responses which, if made by an adult 
animal of another species, we would be tempted to call a claim. 
Natural, original, claims to rights are thus not out of the question 
at this stage and certainly they are available to the newborn. Per-
sonal rights must, of course, wait until later. 
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D. The Permanently Comatose 
Whole brain death, as defined by the Harvard panel,16 entails the 
loss of personal rights, as the term is used in this Article. It also 
entails the loss of claim-making capacity and the capacity to make 
agreements. Claims and agreements made prior to brain death, 
however, may have yielded rights which remain in force. And the 
comatose may have some sorts of derivative and concurrent rights 
as well. 
No doubt the point need not be belabored any longer. The differ-
ences between derivative, original, and concurrent rights are not 
illusory. And the awareness of this trichotomy is a significant help 
in clearing away some confusions both about the justification of 
rights and the range of entities that can be right-holders. 
18 Report of the Harvard Medical School ad hoc Committee on the Definition of Brain 
Death, reprinted in H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL 311-19 (1970). 
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